

The Six Means of Knowledge in Advaita Vedanta

Swami Alokanda

EVERLASTING HAPPINESS is a universal desire. It is for happiness—both mundane and other-worldly—that humans perform various actions. But there is no end to desire. Desires keep cropping up, one after the other. On meeting mundane fulfilment, desires only increase in intensity, just like fire fed with ghee. And the pleasures of heaven end in the continuation of the cycle of birth and death: *‘Kṣīṇe punye martya-lokaṃ viśanti; they enter the mortal world on the exhaustion of their merit.’*¹ Thus, the chain of repeated births and deaths goes on: *‘Punarāpi jananaṃ punarāpi maraṇam; there is birth again, there is death again.’*² Only if all our desires could be fulfilled would we possibly be satisfied. But it is not possible to attain this state of the *āpta-kāma* without Self-realization.

Dharma, virtue, *artha*, wealth, and *kāma*, pleasure, three of the *puruṣārthas*, aims of human life, are transient, and so are their results. But *mokṣa*, liberation, the fourth *puruṣārtha*, is everlasting. That is why the sages proclaim mokṣa as the ultimate *puruṣārtha*: *‘Caturvidha-puruṣārtheṣu mokṣa eva parama-puruṣārthaḥ; among the four human ends, liberation alone is supreme.’*³ The *Chhandogya Upanishad* says: *‘Tarati śokam-ātmavit; the knower of Self transcends grief.’*⁴ The *Shvetashvatara Upanishad* announces: *‘Tam-eva viditvā’ti-mṛtyum-eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate;yanāya; knowing Him alone one transcends death, there is no other way to follow.’*⁵ *‘Ṛte jñānānna muktiḥ; there is no liberation except through Self-knowledge’* is a fundamental

tenet of Advaita Vedanta. These statements affirm that mokṣa is possible only through the knowledge of Brahman.

Jñeya or *prameya*, objects of knowledge, are of two kinds: *vyāvahārika*, pragmatically or relatively real, and *pāramārthika*, absolutely real. All objects of knowledge other than Brahman are *vyāvahārika*. They are valid at the *vyāvahārika* level of worldly activity but are sublated at the *pāramārthika* level of the Absolute. Brahman alone exists at the *pāramārthika* level. It remains unchanged at all times; in fact, it transcends the category of time. This has been described variously in the Shruti and Smṛiti texts. The *Chhandogya Upanishad* says: *‘Sad-eva somyedam-agra āsīt; O noble one (Shvetaketu), in the beginning this was Existence alone.’*⁶ It also says: *‘Tat-tvam-asi; you are That’* (6.12.3). All these texts refer to the one object of knowledge at the *pāramārthika* level, unaffected by time. It is also the sole subject matter of the Upanishads. It is only by attaining this knowledge that a jiva attains mokṣa.

Now the question is: How to attain this knowledge? The means of this knowledge are called *pramāṇas* in Indian philosophy. It has been said, *‘Prameya-siddhiḥ pramāṇāt hi; it is only through valid means that an object of knowledge is known.’*⁷ We have two types of knowledge: *bhrama*, erroneous, and *pramā*, valid. Erroneous knowledge gets sublated when its cause is removed. For example, the illusory snake perceived in a rope vanishes as soon as the reason for this illusion—darkness or weak eyesight, for instance—is removed. That is why the knowledge based on an object liable to be sublated is called ‘erroneous knowledge’. On the other hand, the knowledge of objects not likely

The author is a monastic member of Ramakrishna Advaita Ashrama, Varanasi.

to be sublated in future is *pramā*, true knowledge. *Pramāṇas* are the instruments of valid knowledge: ‘*pramā-karaṇam pramāṇam*.’⁸

There are differences of opinion among Indian philosophers regarding the means of valid knowledge. The Charvakas accept perception alone as means of valid knowledge; the Buddhists and Vaisheshikas accept perception and inference as valid means; the Sankhyas and Yogins, perception, inference, and verbal testimony; the Naiyayikas, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. The Prabhakara Mimamsakas acknowledge presumption as a valid means in addition to the other four, while the Bhatta Mimamsakas and Vedantins posit the following six as valid means of knowledge: perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension. The Pauranikas speak of two additional means—equivalence and tradition—taking the total to eight.⁹

Perception

Pratyakṣa, perception, is the basis of all the other means of knowledge and is also considered superior to them in the empirical realm. All other *pramāṇas* are dependent on *pratyakṣa*. A fire in front can be perceived through the eyes; but inferring that ‘the yonder hill is on fire because smoke is seen atop it’ is contingent on the prior perception of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire. Similarly, in the case of other *pramāṇas* also perception has an important role to play.

The *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* says: ‘*Vijñātāram-are kena vijānīyāt*; through what, O (Maitreyi), should one know the Knower?’¹⁰ Also: ‘*Tad-adreṣyam-agrāhyam*; It cannot be perceived and grasped.’¹¹ The Atman cannot be perceived as an object. Were the Atman to become perceptible as an object, its *mithyātva*, falsity, would also be established, because that which is perceptible by the senses is transitory, non-eternal, and false. But, paradoxically, the fears of worldly existence will not go without direct realization of the Atman. And moksha is attained as soon as the fears of the world are destroyed.

Though all philosophers accept perception as a valid *pramāṇa*, they differ about the details of the process of perception. The Charvakas hold the gross body to be the means of direct perception and consider its preservation their highest *puruṣārtha*. The Naiyayikas hold that perception is of two types. According to them, ‘*Indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-janyam jñānam pratyakṣam*; perception is the knowledge born of contact between a sense organ and its object.’¹² But this definition of perception does not cover the God’s knowledge and thus suffers from *avyāpti doṣa*, the defect of non-comprehensiveness. God’s knowledge, Naiyayikas argue, does not arise out of the contact of sense organs with objects, because this knowledge is eternal and God is not known to have sense organs. To correct this defect, the Naiyayikas introduce a second characteristic of perception: ‘*Jñānakaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*; a cognition that does not have another cognition as its chief instrumental cause is termed perception.’¹³

The Vedantins, however, proclaim that perceptual knowledge is nothing but Brahman. The Upanishads also declare: ‘*Yad-eva sākṣād-āparokṣād-brahma*; that Brahman indeed is immediate and direct.’¹⁴ Perceptual knowledge, according to Vedanta, is nothing but pure Consciousness. The same unitary Consciousness becomes threefold: (i) *viśayagata caitanya*, consciousness associated with objects, (ii) *pramāṇa caitanya*, consciousness associated with the means of knowledge, and (iii) *pramātṛ caitanya*, consciousness associated with the subject or knower. In the process of visual perception, Vedantins say, the *antahkaraṇa*, mind, issues out through the eyes to the object and takes the form of the object. This transformation of the mind is called *vṛtti* and it functions as the *pramāṇa caitanya*, which links the *pramātṛ caitanya* with the *viśayagata caitanya*. It may be worth remembering that, according to Vedantins, even inanimate objects are products of, and are therefore underpinned by, Consciousness. The ‘unified’ presence of the three divisions of Consciousness at the same locus constitutes valid knowledge.

Incidentally, perception need not be of external objects alone. It may be of cognition too. 'I perceive a pot' is an example of the former; and 'I perceive the knowledge of the pot' of the latter.

Perception again is of two kinds: *savikalpaka*, determinate, and *nirvikalpaka*, indeterminate. The knowledge which apprehends the relationship between a substantive and its qualifying attribute is called determinate knowledge. Thus, when we say 'I know the jar', we have the knowledge of the qualifying attribute of 'jar-ness' in the clay or ceramic object in front of us. Indeterminate knowledge does not apprehend such a relation. When one says 'This is that Devadatta whom I saw the other day', only the person of Devadatta is objectified, for his attributes may well have changed in the last few days. This distinction is especially made to underscore the unitary attributeless nature of the Consciousness revealed by such Vedantic statements as *tat-tvam-asi*.

The Naiyayikas object to the latter use of the concept of indeterminate knowledge on the ground that the knowledge arising out of a spoken sentence is dependent on the 'interrelation' of its constituent words and their associated meanings. The meaning of the command 'Bring the cow' is dependent on the understanding of the meanings of the terms 'bring' and 'cow'. Similarly, knowledge arising out of the sentence 'you are That' also involves knowledge of what is 'you' and what is 'That'. Therefore, it cannot be indeterminate.

To this objection Vedantins reply that knowledge arising out of a sentence is not primarily or merely dependent on the interrelatedness of individual word meanings but on their *tātparyā*, purport. Thus, when at lunch one asks for *saindhava*, rock-salt, the server does not go looking for a horse from Sindh, which is also one of the meanings of the term *saindhava*. The author of *Vedanta Paribhasha* reminds us that in the *Chhandogya Upanishad*, in the passage 'beginning with "This universe, my dear, was but Existence in the beginning" and concluding with, "It is the truth, It is the Self, and thou art That, O Śvetaketu"', the intended purport

of Vedantic texts is held to be the Pure Brahman. So how can it express something that is not the intended meaning? That sentences like, "Thou art That", convey a simple notion of identity, only means that they produce valid knowledge that does not apprehend the relation (among the meanings of the words in them).¹⁵

Perception is further classified into two: (i) *jīva-sākṣin*, that due to the witness in the individual self; and (ii) *īśvara-sākṣin*, that due to the witness in God. The jiva is Consciousness limited by the mind. Hence, the witness in the individual self is also limited; and as minds are plural, so are jivas. But God is Consciousness limited by maya, the cosmic illusion. Maya is all-pervading, unlimited, and one. Therefore Ishvara, conditioned by maya, is also all-pervading, unlimited, and one. If maya is mentioned as manifold in some scriptural texts, it is only with respect to its threefold constituents—*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*—and their effects.

Though Brahman is all-pervading and evertrue, we are unable to perceive this fact due to ignorance. By knowing the identity of Brahman and Atman, one's own Self, all the miseries of a person come to an end. It is ignorance that thwarts valid knowledge and keeps us in the throes of a cosmic illusion. On the empirical *vyāvahārika* plane this illusion does not get sublated. That is why the world, an effect of maya, and all our day-to-day interactions have an empirical reality. When the reality of the *vyāvahārika* plane is effectively negated through proper discernment, the semblance of reality which remains is called *prātibhāsika*. Both the *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* planes are, however, based on the *pāramārthika* plane. When the falsity of maya and its effects is established, the identity of Brahman with the individual soul on the *pāramārthika* plane is also established. Thus, one's sufferings in this world come to an end and moksha, the highest *puruṣārtha*, is attained. According to Advaita Vedanta, even a little difference between the individual soul and Brahman is a deterrent to valid perception and causes fear and misery to the jiva. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* declares:

'*Yadā hyevaiṣa etasminn-udaramantaram kurute atha tasya bhayam bhavati*; whenever the aspirant creates the slightest difference in It [Brahman], he is smitten with fear.'¹⁶

Inference

'*Anumiti-karaṇam-anumānam*; inference is the instrument of inferential knowledge.'¹⁷ This knowledge is produced by the apprehension of *vyāpti*, invariable concomitance, between the *sādhya*, the thing to be inferred, and the *hetu*, the ground for inference. That is why it has been said: '*Anumiti-karaṇāṅca vyāpti-jñānam*; the instrument of inferential knowledge is the knowledge of invariable concomitance' (69). 'Where there is smoke, there is fire' is a commonly cited example of invariable concomitance. One who has perceived this association earlier can later infer that 'the hill is on fire' on seeing smoke on the hill. Inference is thus based on the latent mental impressions of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Though inferential knowledge establishes the presence of fire on the hill, it does not clarify the extent of the fire, because there is no contact of the sense organs with the fire. The hill is directly perceived, but the presence of fire there is inferred.

Vedantins also present inference as proof of the unreality of the universe. This inference is based on the denial of all objective entities in the pure Existence that is Brahman. Therefore, the entire universe other than Brahman is unreal because, being separate from Brahman, they have no 'real' existence, much like the nacre mistaken for silver. Though an object may be apparently seen in a place where it does not actually exist, its non-existence there can be proved through discernment. You surely cannot make nacre function like silver! Falsity is, therefore, defined as 'the counter-positive of the absolute non-existence that abides in whatever is supposed to be its substratum' (77). Advaitins, however, accept *vyāvahārika satya*, empirical or conventional existence. When we say 'the pot is there', the pot has a *vyāvahārika* or perceptual existence. It is only on the *pāramārthika* plane of the Absolute that

Advaitins deny conventional reality, for the true nature of Brahman is pure Consciousness devoid of attributes.

Comparison

The instrument of the valid knowledge of similarity is *upamāna*, comparison. After seeing cows in villages, when one sees a gayal in a forest, one says, 'This animal is like a cow.' One also has the conviction, 'My cow is like this.' This is the knowledge of similarity obtained by 'a process of agreement and difference'. It is an indirect piece of knowledge and not a direct perception, as the 'cow' was not in contact with the sense organs when the gayal was perceived. This means of knowledge cannot be classed under inference either, for knowledge of invariable concomitance is not involved herein. Moreover, that inference and comparison are not the same is indicated by the two distinct apperceptions 'I am inferring' and 'I am comparing'.

Vedanta accepts comparison as a proof of valid knowledge because of its special use in attaining the knowledge of Brahman. Though the philosophers do not dwell upon comparison much, it has great significance in popular and Vedic usage, literature, and poetry. In Vedanta, the all-pervasiveness of Brahman has been portrayed in sentences like '*Akāśavat sarvagataśca nityah*; (it is) all-pervading like space and is eternal' and '*Yathā prakāśayatyekah kṛtsnam lokam-imaṁ raviḥ*; as the single sun illumines this whole world'.¹⁸ In fact, the metaphor of the sun has been variedly used to describe the self-luminous nature of the Atman.

Presumption

The assumption of a cause on seeing an effect is called *arthāpatti*, presumption. For instance, if 'the stout Devadatta does not eat in the daytime', then it is easy for a thoughtful person to conclude that Devadatta eats well at night. One cannot, after all, grow stout without eating. This assumption of eating at night in the face of the stoutness of a person who does not eat by the day is a case of *arthāpatti pramā*, presumptive knowledge.

Presumption is of two kinds: *dṛṣṭārthāpatti*, presumption from what is seen, and *śrutārthāpatti*, presumption from what is heard. The example of Devadatta cited above is a case of presumption from seen facts. An Upanishadic statement may be quoted as an example of presumption from what is heard: ‘*Tarati śokam-ātmavit*; the knower of the Self transcends grief.’¹⁹ If grief were real, it could not have been transcended by the knowledge of the Self, for reality involves existence at all times. Vedantins point out that to kill a real snake a stick is required. But the snake imagined on a rope in the dark is removed by the correct perceptive knowledge of the rope. Similarly, if the bondage of the world were real, then some means other than mere knowledge would have been required to destroy it; Self-knowledge alone could not have destroyed it. But, as the Vedic statement ‘*Tarati śokam-ātmavit*’ is accepted as true, all suffering and bondage must be superimposed on the Self due to lack of Self-knowledge. This insight provides the spiritual aspirant with conviction to engage in Vedantic contemplation with enthusiasm and become liberated from bondage by the non-dual experience of the Atman. In this way, presumptive knowledge is also of use in attaining the knowledge of Brahman.

Presumption from what is heard is again of two types: *abhidhānānupapatti*, that due to failure of expression or intention, and *abhibhātānupapatti*, that due to incongruity of meaning.²⁰ When on hearing a part of a sentence one assumes what is unheard, then that is a case of *abhidhānānupapatti*. For example, on hearing the words ‘the door’, one may assume the request ‘shut it’, if the context is appropriate.

Abhibhātānupapatti is said to exist when the meaning of a sentence is incongruous with known facts and demands an additional assumption. Thus, the Vedic statement ‘*Svargakāmo jyotiṣṭomena yajeta*; one who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice’ posits the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice as leading to heaven. However, the sacrifice is over within a fixed period of time, and the sacrificer continues to live on earth. To explain this incon-

gruity, the Mimamsakas, Vedic exegetes, postulate the concept of *apūrva*, unseen result, which acts as an intermediary and lasts till the fruition of the actual result, reaching heaven after death.

Verbal Testimony

A sentence in which the intended relation between the meanings of its constituent words is not contradicted by any other proof of valid knowledge is a means of verbal testimony. The knowledge arising from such sentences is *āgama pramāṇa*, valid verbal testimony. Vedantins construe *āgama pramāṇa* as being of two kinds: *pauruṣeya*, of human origin, and *apauruṣeya*, of divine origin. The Vedas are considered *apauruṣeya* or impersonal because, according to Vedantins, at the time of the Creation the Vedas are projected exactly as they were in the previous cosmic cycle. Swami Vivekananda pointed out that ‘the whole body of supersensuous truths, having no beginning or end, and called by the name of the Vedas, is ever-existent. The Creator Himself is creating, preserving, and destroying the universe with the help of these truths.’²¹ In this sense too the Vedas are *apauruṣeya*. On the other hand, human literary creations like the Mahabharata are independent of any similar previous verbal text. They are thus fresh human creations and are therefore *pauruṣeya*.

The knowledge arising from a sentence is dependent on four factors: *ākāṁṣā*, expectancy, *yogyatā*, consistency, *āsatti*, contiguity, and *tātparyā jñāna*, knowledge of intention. A sentence contains many words; on hearing the verb, we are eager to know its object. Similarly, on hearing the word denoting the object, we are curious to know the verb governing it. This mutual inquiry is termed ‘expectancy’. For instance, soon after hearing the word ‘bring’, one expects words signifying objects: ‘the book’, ‘the pen’, and the like.

‘Consistency’ lies in the meanings of constituent words being mutually non-contradictory. When one says, ‘*Vāhniṇā siñcati*, he is irrigating (the plants with) fire’, listeners are not likely to make any sense of the sentence unless they see an obvious metaphorical usage. ‘Contiguous utterance’ is

another prerequisite for conveying meaning accurately. If one pronounces the word 'Ram' now and an hour later says 'come here', then one cannot expect Ram to understand the intended instruction.

The Naiyayikas declare: '*Vakturicchā tu tātparyam*'; the desire of the speaker is called intention.²² Vedantins do not accept this definition as being faultless. According to this Naiyayika definition, intention is only of the spoken words. But intention is understood even from a piece of writing. Further, when a person chants Vedic mantras like '*Bhadraṃ karṇebhiḥ śṛṇuyāma devāḥ*'; O gods, may we hear auspicious words with the ears²³ without understanding the meaning, it is seen that people conversant with Sanskrit are able to grasp the meaning. Therefore, Vedantins declare: '*Tatpratīti-janana-yogyatvaṃ tātparyam*'; intention is the capacity to produce the cognition of a particular thing.²⁴ The sentence 'There is a jar in the house' produces the cognition of the relation of the house, which is the substratum, and the pot held by the substratum. However, this sentence does not produce the cognition of the relation between a piece of cloth and the house, for that is not its intention.

Therefore, even if a person ignorant of the meaning of the words utters Vedic texts, the listener understands its meaning due to the presence of *tātparyā*, intention, the capability to produce the cognition of the relation between the meanings of the constituent words. Even an atheist can understand the meaning of Vedic texts because intention is inherent in the sentences and is not subservient to the speaker.

It is accepted that words have an inherent power of signification, *vācya śakti*, which gives them meaning. Therefore, this inherent power can be said to be the supporting cause for the cognition of the meaning of words. When the direct denotation is not applicable, then an implied meaning, *lakṣaṇā*, has to be resorted to.

The knowledge obtained from verbal testimony may be either direct or indirect. For instance, the sentence 'There are ten persons in yonder house'

produces indirect knowledge, while the sentence 'You are the tenth person here' produces direct knowledge. Similarly, an aspirant endowed with the preliminary qualifications for spiritual life gets the indirect knowledge of Brahman from the sentence '*Asti brahma*'; Brahman exists.²⁵ Then, when they hear the *mahāvākya* '*tat-tvam-asi*' from a guru established in the knowledge of Brahman, they attain direct experiential knowledge, *aparokṣa jñāna*, of Brahman as '*Ahaṃ brahmāsmi*'; I am Brahman.²⁶ Therefore, Brahman is called '*aupaniṣada puruṣa*', because the nature of Brahman can be known only through the statements of the Upanishads. Though the Vedic sentences are cognized with the help of the ear, these same statements establish the falsity of the sense organs and related means of knowledge in the context of the absolute reality of Brahman. On attaining this unitary knowledge of Brahman one becomes fulfilled. This attainment is the highest *puruṣārtha*.

Non-apprehension

Vedantins consider *anupalabdhi*, non-apprehension, as a separate means of knowledge, distinct from perception, which reveals the non-existence of the entities concerned. This distinction is important because when one records 'the absence of a pot on the ground', there is no visual contact with any perceptible entity other than the ground; and sense contact, Vedantins note, is an essential component of perception. The knowledge of the non-existence of the pot is thus the product of non-apprehension, which is a piece of knowledge in itself.

Four types of non-existence are recognized by Vedantins: *prāgabdhāva*, prior non-existence; *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, non-existence as destruction; *atyantābhāva*, absolute non-existence; and *anyonyābhāva*, mutual non-existence. The absence of a pot in the clay before its production is termed 'prior non-existence'. When after being manufactured the pot is broken down with a stick, then this is a case of 'non-existence as destruction'. Air does not have any form; it never had, nor will it ever have one. This absence of form at all times—

past, present, and future—is called ‘absolute non-existence’. A pot is not a cloth, and neither is a cloth a pot. This is ‘mutual non-existence’.

Mutual non-existence is further classified into two on the basis of its substratum having a beginning, *sādi*, or not, *anādi*. Thus, the absence of a cloth in a pot is contingent on the manufacture of the pot, but the absence of individual souls in Brahman is without beginning, for Brahman is eternally impartite. These differences are also classified as *sopādhika*, conditioned, and *nirupādhika*, unconditioned. For instance, though space is unitary, containers and houses create the impression of difference by delimitation. This is called conditioned difference. But the difference between the pot and the cloth is free of any such conditioning factors, *upādhis*.

Though there is no difference in the indivisible Consciousness that is Brahman on the *pāramārthika* plane, differences are seen between the individual soul and God in the universe created through *maya*. When *avidyā*, the individual aspect of *maya*, is negated through a direct experience of the identity of the individual soul and Brahman, all differentiation—the effect of *avidyā*—is also destroyed. This leaves the realized soul with the indivisible non-dual experience of Brahman: Existence-Consciousness-Bliss Absolute. As the dream world does not exist for a person who has awakened from sleep, for an illumined person who has attained to the *pāramārthika* plane *maya* and its effect, the universe, cease to be.

This direct experiential knowledge of Brahman is the ultimate human end, the highest *puruṣārtha*. Advaita Vedanta accepts the six means of knowledge as aids to attaining this *puruṣārtha*. Some teachers of Advaita believe that a sequential process of *śravaṇa*, hearing Vedantic dicta from a competent teacher, *manana*, reflection on those dicta, and *nididhyāsana*, meditation on their purport, leads to the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul and Brahman. Others aver that the qualified aspirant free from the defects of *asambhāvanā*, doubt, and *viparita bhāvanā*, erroneous conceptions, at-

tains the knowledge of Brahman immediately on hearing any of the Vedantic *mahāvākyas*, like *tat-tvam-asi*. Such competent ‘hearing’ directly removes all doubt about the validity of Vedantic statements through a direct apprehension of Reality. When this does not occur, *manana* is needed to remove doubt regarding the identity of the individual soul and Brahman, while *nididhyāsana* aids the establishment in Brahman by negating erroneous conceptions contrary to truth. 

Notes and References

1. Bhagavadgita, 9.21.
2. Shankaracharya, ‘Charpata-panjarika-stotra’, 8.
3. See Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, trans. Swami Madhavananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2004), 3–4.
4. *Chhandogya Upanishad*, 7.1.3.
5. *Shvetashvatara Upanishad*, 3.8; 6.15.
6. *Chhandogya Upanishad*, 6.2.1.
7. Ishvarakrishna, *Sankhya Karika*, 4.
8. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, 4.
9. *Pratyakṣam-ekam cārvākāḥ kānāda-sugatau punaḥ Anumānaṅca taccātha sāṅkhyāḥ śabdaśca te api; Nyāyaikadeśino’py-evam-upamānaṅca kecana Arthāpatyā sahaitāni catvāry-āha prābhākarāḥ; Abhāva-ṣaṣṭhāny-etāni bhāṭṭa-vedāntinas-tathā; Sambhava-aitihyāny-uktāni tāni paurāṇikā jaguḥ.*
Varadarajacharya, *Tarkika Raksha* (Varanasi, 1903), 56.
10. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, 2.4.14.
11. *Mundaka Upanishad*, 1.1.6.
12. Annambhatta, *Tarka Sangraha*, section 42.
13. See Stephen H Philips and N S Ramanuja Tatacharya, *Epistemology of Perception* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2009), 334.
14. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, 3.4.2.
15. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, 35–6.
16. *Taittiriya Upanishad*, 2.7.1.
17. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, 68.
18. *Brahma Sutra*, 2.3.4; Gita, 13.33.
19. *Chhandogya Upanishad*, 7.1.3.
20. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, 120.
21. *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, 9 vols (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1–8, 1989; 9, 1997), 6.181.
22. *Bhasha Pariccheda*, 84.
23. *Rig Veda*, 1.89.8.
24. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, 106–7.
25. *Taittiriya Upanishad*, 2.6.1.
26. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, 1.4.10.