The Paradox

The Central government if it has any inclination to diffuse the situation on the ground has to resolve a paradox. The National Conference which leads the ruling alliance in J&K shares and identifies with the common minimum agenda of campaigners in the Valley streets. In a full page advertisement, the state government declared its three main and primary achievements since assuming power: i). Bold decision taken after 20 years to replace CRPF by locals police; ii) First CM to plead eloquently for withdrawal of AFSPA, Union Government flags the issue; iii) Presence of Magistrates with police/security forces made mandatory while dealing with law and order problems and iv) Bomai (Army) camp re-located within a month.

The main opposition PDP, both factions of Hurriyat and the local Bar Council all have revocation of AFPSA and demilitarization as their main demands. We have a piquant situation where the opposition, mainstream as well as separatist, and the state government are politically on the same side.

The situation becomes bizarre when a section of the Government of India identifies with this consensus. The incidental or accidental remarks of Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari, while referring to the PM’s Working Group on Confidence Building Measures of which he was then Chairman, justified the key demand of separatists during the current unrest. The Vice President observed that implementation of its recommendations was considered by the Prime Minister as the key to retaining people’s confidence. In his own report then as chairman of the Working Group, ignoring the dissent within, Ansari recommended revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The entire report did not address anti- terrorism measures as a vital component of confidence building in the state.

Even though in all incidents which lead to protests in recent times, the suspected culprits were locals working in local police or territorial army or government officials, the foremost demand of everybody of consequence was removal of paramilitary forces and army from the state.

India Ragdo-Intifada has nothing to do with the incidents which caused public resentment. It essentially uses the incidents to lacerate symbols of Indian sovereignty. It seeks to project an extremely permissive, conniving and inactive state as a demonic police state. The Government, unwilling to defend its security establishment, takes a totally defensive position and allows public mobilizations by the most regressive and fundamentalist regimes operating on the ground. It declares lack of intention to act publicly by either withdrawing its security forces or ordering them not to intervene, whatever the provocation.

The ruling National Conference has an ideological resonance with the common minimum programme of agitationists to force demilitarization, but an existential need to preserve the military presence. The central government knows that any laxity in security operations in the state may lead to catastrophic results, given the situation in Pakistan. Yet it seeks to maintain the stance of a neutral player while its security forces are described and lampooned as an occupation force in the valley. Civilians in the valley know well that the very survival of civil society depends upon the security forces, yet they demonize them. The paradox is deep and powerful.