" CAN'T DO IT " ARMY HQ

The army, instead of finding solutions, seemed to have reconciled that there was no way India could defend its border with China. Subsequent to the Chinese taking over Tibet in 1950, there was activity at the Army HQ. It was decided to set up 21 check-posts in NEFA. Hardly any action was taken as it was hoped that negotiations would solve the border problem. There were conferences, committees which gave suggestions but resulted in little ground action.

Subsequent to the Panchsheel Pact in 1954, Nehru wrote to the Defence Secretary amongst others that check posts be set up along the entire frontier esp in the possible disputed areas. This important instruction was unfortunately not followed up with a plan of action. Following the Shipki La incident in Himachal Pradesh in 1956, Nehru issued detailed instructions, the corner stone of which was, if you cross the present position, we shall not permit you, but will not attack but report to Delhi to take up the matter with Peking.( This is taking the doctrine of non-violence to the extreme.) Third spurt of activity was in 1958 following the knowledge of the Chinese action in Akshai Chin. In January 1959, it was agreed to open some civilian check posts. The Western Command instructed that while protecting our area if the Chinese were encountered they were to be persuaded to leave our territory and the matter would be taken up through diplomatic channels.( Tell me how naive could the army be. Had not the Chinese given us sufficient warnings of their intentions). In the October of 1959 the army suddenly woke up to the inadequacies of its preparedness in Ladakh but resulted in insignificant action again.

At the end of 1959, despite repeated warnings from the PM, the situation was similar to what it was in 1954. Meanwhile, China had built a network of roads in Ladakh. A decision taken in May 1960 to patrol unoccupied, undisputed territories was not implemented due to various logistical difficulties. To be fair to the army they had a problem.( You can either handle such a situation by keeping quiet, taking the responsibility onto yourself or bring the cabinet down by creating hue and cry.) The army is at fault for not making people realize the gravity of the situation.

After 1960 the army realized that a war was imminent and decided to put a sense of urgency into the govt. However, the Hindi-Chin bhai bhai had caught everyone's imagination so it was not easy to goad them into action. In 1960, considerable Chinese activity was noticed around the Hot Springs area in Ladakh, deep inside Indian territory. It was decided at the highest level to strengthen our posts but sadly enough three months later, the decision remained on paper only. In early 1961, Kaul admitted that the army was not in a position to repel any Chinese incursions into our territory.

In the amidst of all this action, with a looming war ahead there appears to be no strategic thinking by the Army to study Chinese tactics etc. In the army, words like " This cannot be done " cannot exists. Things just have to be done to protect the country. Meetings with no action are a waste of time and have a demoralizing effect on action oriented soldiers. (sometimes I wonder what prevents us from engaging Pakistan in a full scale war. Is it, that the Indian army realizes that they would loose badly. Defence Minister George Fernandes recently spoke of huge casualties if the proxy war were to escalate. Was it a tacit admission of under preparedness ! )