• Book review of a fascinating book on the Indian Navy by Micky Roy. It includes the Naval Commando operations in East Pakistan 1971 War.

For decades, copies of The War in the Indian Ocean were difficult to find, leaving students of Indian military history searching for the occasional surviving copy. In the centenary year of Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, Meluha Maritime is honoured to have helped bring out a revised edition of this seminal work, making it accessible once again to a new generation of readers.

Published by Sabre & Quill Publishers in association with the Roy family, the new edition features a foreword by Admiral Arun Prakash, alongside the original foreword by Admiral S. M. Nanda. We hope its return to print will renew engagement with Admiral Roy’s work and the maritime questions that animated his life and thoughts.

In January 1989, Vice Admiral Mihir Kumar ‘Micky’ Roy became the first officer from the Armed Forces to be selected for the prestigious Nehru Fellowship. The two-year fellowship enabled him to pursue an in-depth study and research on the ‘Emerging Relations between India and the Indian Ocean.' This research would eventually form the foundation of his book, The War in the Indian Ocean.

1 Vice Admiral Mihir Kumar 'Micky' Roy. Image credit: Roy Family. Enhanced by AI.

While the book came out in 1995, it was based to a large extent on his research and study during the fellowship from January 1989 to January 1991. The book offers several insights into the man and his method—indeed his whole way of thinking. 

To begin with, the title is somewhat misleading because the book covers many other aspects beyond the 1971 War. The preface to the book gives us many clues about the content and his approach. Micky could well have written simply about the war given that he was in a pivotal place and, until then, there had been very few accounts of the war. He could have written an autobiography, too, given that he had led a multihued, interesting life and there were so few in that genre with regard to Indian Navy personnel. One does not know why he did not; possibly, he wanted to escape the ‘self-laudatory’ trap that many such accounts fall into.

Instead, and very interestingly, he set out to write on the much larger subject of India’s tryst with the Indian Ocean and Indian Navy as a key actor. Such a subject can be ambitious in scope and can often result in gaps or subjective choice of themes, but Micky was open to taking these risks. 

As he saw it, the history of the Indian Ocean lent itself to being broadly divided into seven periods, which formed the parameters of “this story of sailors and ships in the Indian Ocean.” 

These periods, according to him, were of Period of Cultural and Commercial Activity: (2000 BC - AD 622), The Onset of Sea-blindness: (AD 622 - AD 1500), Period of Colonization: (1500 – 1945), Period of Decolonization: (1945 – 1962), Period of Superpower Confrontation: (1962 – 1989), Demise of Cold War and Apartheid: (1989 – 1993), Period of Cooperation and Oceanic Trading Blocs: (1993 onwards). It is very clear that such a chronological delineation may not have found approval with many historians. Or it was too pat, almost force fitting this into his template. Like, for example, categorizing the period since 1993 as that of ‘Cooperation and Trading Blocks’ was probably premature and more designed to fit into his thesis and work at that point of time. But Micky may not have been deterred by such comments. He was, in his mind, reflecting the zeitgeist of the times. 

He backed his book with enormous research though. In addition to his own notes and experience, he constantly scoured libraries, read publications, attended seminars and conferences in all the think tanks and academic bodies then. He is thankful that all of them were located in Delhi and thus they provided him inputs “for analysing the changing relations between India and the Indian Ocean.” In addition, he spoke to several people and formally interviewed many of them. 

As he puts it, “above all, I was overwhelmed by my shipmates, fellow aviators and submariners who poured out their hearts as they were obviously starved of the ‘right to know’ of their valuable contribution in the defeat of Pakistan and the capture of 92,000 prisoners which historic event still remains under wraps even after a quarter of a century. I therefore meticulously refrained from discussions with serving officers as also kept well clear of official files and records.” Micky highlights several points in this sentence. 

That he did not speak to serving officers, that the event still remained under wraps as there was no official historical account and many of the people who were involved in the war and contributed to the outcome felt their efforts unacknowledged. And that his book was an attempt to make up for that.

The credible part about his research is that he also studied and quoted from Pakistan Navy accounts including their official history published in 1991. He dovetails Pakistani accounts into his while describing missile attacks on Karachi, the sinking of Khukri and the naval operations in East Pakistan. He also refers to the account, purportedly written by his RIN batch mate, late Pakistani Naval Chief Vice Admiral HH Ahmed, Beginning Anew after 1971. In doing so, Micky wryly remarks that, “the chemistry of salt water for bringing together the hearts and minds of people is difficult to comprehend in the continental mindset of South Asia.” Strangely, he opines that this chemistry forged at sea could ‘influence the texture of the country’s strategic, economic and trading perceptions’ and hopefully engender ‘cooperative programmes thus enlarging the universal brotherhood of the seas’. 

This is probably the rare occasion that a realist Micky went into woolly headed optimism, especially with regard to Pakistan, and it probably had to do with him pre-determining that the post 1993 period would be one of cooperation. Future events would prove him dreadfully wrong and one place where he was not as perceptive. Of course, he recalibrated his opinions and molded his views based on developments that took place later.

Micky is, however, clear about his focus area in the book. Writing forthrightly, with a bit of wry humour thrown in, he says, “with the benefit of a ring-side seat and with my memory not being unduly ravaged by time or stimulants, I have tried to put together a comprehensive and accurate story of some of the hitherto untold operations of the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict at sea. I have therefore encouraged the actual participants, wherever possible, to give first-hand accounts in their own words to lend credibility to events that were enacted 24 years ago.” 

Writing specifically about the Naval Commando operations, he brings out that, “the chapter on the Mukti Bahini frogmen of East Pakistan sinking/damaging over a lakh ton of shipping is perhaps the only account available on this brilliantly conducted guerrilla operation with limpet mines in estuarine waters which in hindsight was more effective than the much-publicized guerrilla tactics in Vietnam. My East Bengal background of Barisal and Bogra was of considerable advantage in piecing together this exciting operation where a handful of frogmen, with little equipment, were able to sink more ships and river craft than all the navies in the Indian Ocean.” 

He acknowledges the leadership of Admiral S. M. 'Charles' Nanda and describes him as ‘a humane and dynamic leader’. He further goes to say that Nanda “fended off weak hearts and encouraged all and sundry to ‘just do it’ which culminated in the brilliant and audacious operations at sea in December 1971. This refurbished the image of the gallant officers and sailors of the Indian Navy in which defence services, the leadership, and personality of Charles Nanda will remain inextricably intertwined.” Nanda, in turn, returns the compliment. This is not a case of ‘you scratch my back; I scratch yours’ kind of certification but more about two old soldiers of war acknowledging each other’s role.

Says Nanda in the foreword to the book, “I am glad to see that Mihir Roy who was associated with me as my Director of Intelligence has decided to tell the story of the Indian Navy before memories are further dimmed and the principal actors have faded away. War in the Indian Ocean is a well-documented and informative story of the Indian Navy with anecdotes which will be read with critical interest by not only the exponents of sea-power the world over, but also by students of maritime history as also by politicians and academics who tend to operate from outside the harsh environment of the wind and the waves. It is hence necessary to record for history the professionalism, courage and devotion to duty of the participants, many of whom are still fortunately present, albeit in the late evening of their lives. They will at least have the satisfaction of leaving behind in the footprints of time their contribution to the honour and service of their country which I am confident will refurbish the image and tradition of the sea forces of peninsular India.”

2. Adm Nanda as Chief of the Naval Staff and Capt Roy as the Director Naval Intelligence. Image credit: Roy family.

Pic was published in Operation X by Capt MNR Samant and Sandeep Unnithan, Harper Collins Publishers India.

It is noteworthy that Nanda and Micky harp on similar themes. To begin with, a historical record of the Indian Navy in the war was necessary for posterity. It would also honor the contribution of all those who took part in the conflict. Further, this has not happened adequately enough through official channels. Also, this omission possibly owes to our leaders and decision makers not having enough exposure to seas and, therefore, not adequately appreciating the maritime domain. Finally, such an exercise will continue to emphasize the role and importance of maritime forces for a country like India. Both recognised that neglect of the maritime domain had contributed to India’s colonisation, a concern that recurs in different ways throughout their writings.

Few other things also stand out in the book. The book has an interesting dedication.

To “my shipmates, fellow aviators and submariners” indicates his deep involvement with aviation (understandable) and submarine arm (which he took up with crusading zeal). It is also dedicated to his grandchildren Aditya, Ishani and Avik who he hoped “will not be afflicted by the sea-blindness of their forefathers.” 

The breakdown of chapters is interesting too. 

While Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are devoted to the war, Chapter 1 traces the historical arc from India’s oceanic heritage from ancient times and right up to the happening of Pax Britannica. This is again typically Micky—strategy, geopolitics, geoeconomics, technology and history tend to coalesce in his view of events and developments of times past and present. 

Chapter 2 is even more absorbing. He boldly calls it ‘Decolonization of Seapower’ – a phrase that is probably his unique coinage. This covers the RIN Uprising of February 1946, partition, Junagadh operations, Goa liberation, Sino-Indian Conflict, the 1965 War and the Topass mutiny of early 70s. He also dwells on what he terms as ‘India’s security perceptions during the Nehru-Krishna Menon period’ of which he clearly takes a dim view. Micky pulls no punches in his observations on the shortcomings of the authorities be they in government or the navy. He is, thus, acerbic about not correctly deploying Vikrant in the Goa liberation operation and critical about how the navy was (not) used in the 1965 War. He doesn’t take a kind view of the fact that the Indian government did not include the navy into its decision-making matrix or ever consider the navy in its concept of sea power. He is equally critical of the navy depending on British leadership even for more than a decade after independence. He also took a different view of the RIN mutiny (Uprising) of February 1946, viewing it not as insubordination or mutinous conduct but as an essential aspect of decolonisation of sea power. In fact, in this respect he can almost be considered as having a deeply nationalist outlook to the navy.

The final chapter is Micky’s gaze at the future. It is a mix of his wish list—how he foresees the world will turn out to be and an acknowledgment that the Indian Ocean affairs will involve many things besides the navy. Grandiosely titled ‘Turbulence and Tranquillity in the Indian Ocean’, it aims to be magisterial in its approach but falters due to the medley of subjects he takes on board. 

However, one must admire and appreciate the breadth of his vision – he flags several issues from climate change to maritime literacy to navy as an instrument of state policy before rounding off with a ‘Sine Qua Non of India’s Seapower in Twenty-first Century’ which was also the title of his thesis at RCDS and took from the dissertation he had submitted. 

In this chapter, Micky calls for “a National Council for Maritime Affairs since there are sixteen ministries in India dealing with ocean activities but with hardly any coordination either for overall planning or rationalising, funding and budgeting.” 

That the office of the National Maritime Security Coordinator (NMSC) was set up, thirty years later, in 2022 is a tribute to the maritime vision that he and others of his ilk showed and to their relentless campaign.

The most remarkable thing about the book though is that Micky is very reticent about his own role, especially when speaking about the 1971 War, particularly the Naval Commando operations. While he talks about his friendship with Raja Ramanna and how that influenced the nuclear submarine program as well as how he was a member of Nanda’s core team with a dash of bombast, he remains completely tight-lipped on NCO(X). While highlighting the operation in great detail and acknowledging that it was being brought out for the first time, he does not anywhere take the slightest credit for being the ringmaster of the operation. As Sandeep Unnithan brings out, “in his book, Micky leaves sufficient bread crumbs for the curious to follow but never once brings out his central role." 

Towards the end of the preface, Micky, once again, passionately stresses on the need for India to tack to the seas urgently and says, “I however own sole responsibility for any omissions or commissions in this story of India’s Navy. If in any way, I have overstepped the mark, it is only due to my enduring affair stretching over 50 years with a demanding oceanic mistress named after the subcontinent of India. May the oceans continue to be auspicious to the plains of Hindustan until the sea-blindness affecting the subcontinent is reduced to enable India to quicken her faltering maritime stride into the twenty-first century and not remain becalmed in the Ocean of Destiny.” It was to be an enduring theme of his life. 

The book has its infirmities. The tone is uneven; it could have done with much better editing, and coherence is missing in places. Time and space are constantly skewed as Micky flips from one subject to another. He does it easily in his mind but is unable to take the reader along. And it doesn’t totally get out of the trap of self-eulogizing. But these are small blemishes in what is undoubtedly a masterly book. It is a pity the book is rarely available these days. It is a must for any person researching the Indian Navy and to anyone trying to understand India’s maritime tryst. 

You can check out The War in the Indian Ocean by Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, PVSM, AVSM here: Paperback:  Hardcover:  

Commodore Srikant Kesnur, VSM, PhD (Retd) - P. S. This review examines the original edition of the book, published in 1995. Several errors identified in the original text were corrected in the revised edition, including typographical and factual errors, as well as inadvertent omissions. Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

Author     Cmde Srikant Kesnur (Retd) served in the Indian Navy for 36 years, with a career spanning maritime operations, training, leadership, diplomacy and naval history. An alumnus of the National Defence Academy, he commanded two frontline warships, INS Vindhyagiri and INS Jalashwa, and served as Defence Adviser at the High Commission of India in Nairobi. He held faculty appointments at the National Defence Academy, Defence Services Staff College and Naval War College. 

A PhD holder with five postgraduate degrees, he has led the writing and editing of numerous books, monographs and naval journals. He was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal in 2021 for distinguished service. Since retiring in 2022, he has championed maritime awareness through research, writing, teaching, public lectures and media.

He is an Adjunct Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, visiting faculty at the Naval War College, and co-founder of Meluha Maritime, a  boutique consulting firm specialising in India’s maritime and naval domains. He can be reached at @srikantkesnur on X and at www.meluhamaritime.com